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Critical review of the use of the Rorschach in European courts
Igor Areha , Fanny Verkamptb and Alfred Allanc
aFaculty of Criminal Justice and Security, University of Maribor, Ljubljana, Slovenia; bCLLE,
Universite de Toulouse, CNRS, Toulouse, France; cSchool of Arts and Humanities, Edith Cowan
University, Perth, Australia
In relation to the admissibility of evidence obtained using projective personality tests arose
in F v. Bevandorlasi es Allampolgarsagi Hivatam (2018). The Court of Justice of the
European Union has held that an expert’s report can only be accepted if it is based on the
international scientific community’s standards, but has refrained from stipulating what these
standards are. It appears timely for European psychologists to decide what standards should
be applied to determine whether or not a test is appropriate for psycholegal use. We propose
standards and then apply them to the Rorschach because it was used in this case and is an
exemplar of projective tests. We conclude that the Rorschach does not meet the proposed
standards and that psychologists should abstain from using it in legal proceedings even in
the absence of a clear judicial prohibition.
Keywords: psychology; law; forensic assessment; courts; professional standards; ethics;
evidential value; acceptability; projective test; Rorschach.
The applicant in F v. Bevandorlasi es
Allampolgarsagi Hivatal (“F v. Hungary”
2018) was a Nigerian male who applied for
asylum in Hungary claiming that he feared
persecution in Nigeria because of his homo-
sexuality. The Hungarian government
(Government) asked a panel of psychologists
to assess the veracity of the applicant’s claim
that he was homosexual before granting him
asylum. The panel could neither confirm nor
deny the applicant’s sexual orientation and
therefore the Government denied his applica-
tion for asylum on the basis that it could not
establish his general credibility. The applicant
took the matter to the Hungarian Court of
Appeal, which asked the Court of Justice of
the European Union (Court) to make a prelim-
inary finding regarding the use of an expert
report by psychologists who had used three
projective tests (Draw-A-Person-In-The-Rain,
Rorschach and Szondi). The Court in its deci-
sion made two comments and one ruling that
are of importance in this article. The first com-
ment is that in circumstances such as in this
case ‘it must be considered that consent of the
person concerned [… ] is not freely given’ (F
v. Hungary, 2018, para. 53) and that, under
these circumstances, tests might be used ‘only
if they are necessary and genuinely meet the
objectives of [… ] the European Union or the
need to protect the rights and freedoms of
others’ (F v. Hungary, 2018, para. 55). It
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further commented that the use of projective
tests (i.e. tests that use non-structured, unclear
stimuli such as ink blots to induce responses;
see Erickson et al., 2007) had been vigorously
contested during the case. The Court made no
decision regarding these points, saying that
these matters would have to be decided by the
relevant government and national court in
each case. The Court continued to assert that
an expert’s report is only acceptable ‘if it is
based on sufficiently reliable methods and
principles in the light of the standards recog-
nised by the international scientific commu-
nity’ (F v. Hungary, 2018, para. 58). However,
it did not state what these standards are or
decide whether or not it was acceptable to use
the three projective tests, saying that this was a
decision that the national court had to consider
on the facts.
Lawyers criticised the judges in F v.
Hungary (2018) for failing to provide guid-
ance as to how authorities can decide whether
or not a psychological test is a method that
meets international standards, and they made
negative comments about psychological tests
in general (e.g. Ferreira & Venturi, 2018; A.
Gould, 2019). These negative comments were
mostly aimed at projective tests, but they
reflect on all the tests that psychologists use –
and indeed on the profession itself. We there-
fore believe that the decision of the court and
the lawyers’ comments require European
psychologists to publicly declare what stand-
ards they and lawyers should use to determine
whether or not tests are ‘sufficiently
reliable methods [… ] in the light of the stand-
ards recognised by the international scientific
community’ (F v. Hungary, 2018, para. 58).
We will first discuss the relevant inter-
national standards and propose a set of con-
temporary standards that psychologists and
lawyers can use to determine whether or not a
test is sufficiently reliable for use in psychole-
gal work. We will then use these standards to
critically consider the use of the Rorschach in
court because (a) it is frequently used in some
European countries (see Areh, 2020) and (b) it
is an exemplar of projective tests, as well as
being the best known, most thoroughly
researched and arguably most frequently
used of the three projective tests that were
used in F v. Hungary (2018).
International standards
The legal question that the Court faced in F v.
Hungary (2018) is whether or not the expert
witnesses based their testimony on theories
and techniques that fall into an area of expert-
ise. Courts must generally answer this question
when they decide whether or not to admit testi-
mony based on emerging theories and techni-
ques, and the different approaches used to do
this are beyond the ambit of this article (for a
discussion, see Freckelton, 2019). It is enough
to say here that courts, in many countries,
share the Court’s reluctance to set out the spe-
cific standards that should be used to deter-
mine whether or not a specific theory or
technique can be accepted as an area of expert-
ise (Freckelton, 2019). The United States (US)
Supreme Court is, however, an exception to
this general rule. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals (1993), it indeed set out four
requirements (the Daubert-standards) that are
very influential – even in jurisdictions where
courts have not explicitly adopted them
(Freckelton, 2019).
Daubert-case
The plaintiffs in this case alleged that a drug
called Bendectin had caused the birth defects
of their children. The defendant called an
expert who, after reviewing the extensive pub-
lished scientific literature, concluded ‘that the
maternal use of Bendectin has not been shown
to be a risk factor for human birth defects’
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 1993, p. 582). The
plaintiff in response called eight expert wit-
nesses who based on novel animal studies and
chemical analyses of the drug concluded that
Bendectin can cause birth defects. The Federal
Court could not consider the opinion of these
eight witnesses because it was bound by the
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rule laid down in Frye v. United States (1923)
‘that expert opinion based on a scientific tech-
nique is inadmissible unless the technique is
“generally accepted” as reliable in the relevant
scientific community’ (Daubert v. Merrell
Dow, 1993, p. 584). The Federal Court there-
fore ‘declared that expert opinion based on a
methodology that diverges “significantly from
the procedures accepted by recognized author-
ities in the field [… ] cannot be shown to be”
generally accepted as a reliable’ (Daubert v.
Merrell Dow, 1993, p. 584). The Supreme
Court, however, held that the rule in the Frye-
case did not apply anymore and that judges
must in each case assess the validity of scien-
tific testimony (see Faigman, 1995). The
Supreme Court, with reference to the work of
Popper (1989), asserted:
Many considerations will bear on the
inquiry, including whether the theory
or technique in question can be (and has
been) tested, whether it
has been subjected to peer review and
publication, its known or potential
error rate and the existence and maintenance
of standards controlling
its operation, and whether it has attracted
widespread acceptance
within a relevant scientific community.
The inquiry is a flexible one,
and its focus must be solely on principles
and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate. (Daubert
v. Merrell Dow, 1993, p. 580)
In Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael
(1999), the Supreme Court clarified that this so-
called Daubert test applies to all expert testimony
(see Beecher-Monas, 1998), and the standards of
this test have been applied to psychology in the
US (seeUnited States v. Hall, 1996). Both lawyers
(e.g. Beecher-Monas, 1998) and psychologists
(e.g. Melton et al., 2018) have accepted that a psy-
chological test – defined as ‘a set of items that has
accepted levels of reliability and validity and
allows measurement of some attribute of an indi-
vidual’ (Australian Psychological Society, 2014,
para. 7.1) – is a technique as envisaged in the
Daubert case. The Daubert test is, however, very
broad, and each discipline and profession should
therefore consider how the test applies to it.
Testability
Psychologists generally interpret testability to
mean that the theory upon which the psycho-
logical test is based must have been empirically
examined and challenged (J. W. Gould et al.,
2013). Lawyers such as Beecher-Monas (1998)
have observed that this standard might create a
dilemma for those parts of psychology that rely
mainly on retrospective observational studies
and not controlled experimentation. However,
as with all the other Daubert standards, testabil-
ity is a necessity and of relevance to psycho-
logical testimony (see Bow et al., 2006).
Peer review and publication
Psychologists have pointed out that the second
standard, namely whether or not the test ‘has
been subjected to peer review and publication’
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 1993, p. 593),
should be interpreted with caution given publi-
cation biases (see Rothstein et al., 2005).
Scholars have pointed out that authors prefer
to submit – and editors prefer to publish –
positive results, thereby favouring the alterna-
tive versus null hypothesis and causing a posi-
tive-results bias (Nosek et al., 2012).
Consequently, the results of meta-analyses –
which psychologists consider the most reliable
method of assessing acceptance (Marlowe,
1995) – can be distorted, contributing to the
survival of poor-quality theories (Ferguson &
Heene, 2012).
Error rate
Lawyers (e.g. Beecher-Monas, 1998) and psy-
chologists (e.g. J. W. Gould et al., 2013)
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interpret the ‘known or potential rate of error’
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 1993, p. 594) as a
reference to psychometric properties of tests
like their validity and reliability. Validity can
be in the form of construct (i.e. does it measure
the construct of interest, such as psychopathy?)
or predictive or discriminative (i.e. how accur-
ate is it in the prediction of the behaviour of
interest, such as that an offender will
reoffend?) validity. Reliability refers to meas-
urement consistency, precision and repeatabil-
ity, and the relevant coefficients indicate the
degree to which test scores are free from error
(Groth-Marnat & Wright, 2016).
General acceptance
The general acceptance of a psychological test
can be determined by examining either the fre-
quency of its use or its general acceptance as a
credible test by the scientific community, as
recorded in notable scientific publications (e.g.
McCann & Evans, 2008). The test must there-
fore meet the profession’s requirements for
valid and reliable psychological tests, which
we discuss next.
Professional requirements
Professional bodies such as the American
Educational Research Association (2014), the
International Test Commission (2013) and the
United States National Council on
Measurement in Education (2014) have devel-
oped standards for psychological tests in gen-
eral. The uniqueness of assessments for courts
(Melton et al., 2018), however, has prompted
professional bodies representing psychologists
who provide psycholegal services – like the
American Psychological Association (APA,
2013) and the Australian Psychological
Society (2013) – to stipulate the standards that
their members should adhere to when conduct-
ing assessments for the courts. The APA
stresses that tests should have an ‘adequate sci-
entific foundation’ (APA, 2013, Guideline
2.05) and measure ‘response style, voluntari-
ness, and situational stress associated with the
involvement in forensic or legal matters’
(APA, 2013, Guideline 10.02). Authors also
contribute to the literature with papers explor-
ing the importance of issues such as the stand-
ardisation of test administration (Lee
et al., 2003).
Even before the Daubert case, psycholegal
scholars considered what standards psycholo-
gists could use to justify their choice of tests
for forensic assessment (e.g. Heilbrun, 1992).
Many of their standards are similar to what the
profession generally requires of psychological
tests. Heilbrun (1992) for instance required
that tests should be commercially available
and have manuals that provide standardised
administration procedures, scoring instruc-
tions, population norms to assist with interpret-
ation and finally information which
demonstrates that they have acceptable levels
of validity and reliability. Psychologists like
Melton et al. (2018) have, since the Daubert
case, specifically considered its impact on
psychologists’ choices of tests in psychole-
gal contexts.
Ethical requirements
Psychologists who do psycholegal work
should further adhere to the ethical principles
and standards of their profession (see Allan,
2013, 2018). The Meta-Code of Ethics of the
European Federation of Psychologists’
Associations (EFPA, 2005) provides a useful
guide in this regard. Paragraph 3.1.2 requires
psychologists to collect only the information
that they need for the professional tasks they
are undertaking. Paragraph 3.2.3 reminds psy-
chologists to consider the limits of the proce-
dures that they use and the limits of the
conclusions that can be drawn from data col-
lected using such procedures, further requiring
them ‘to practise within, and to be aware of
the psychological community’s critical devel-
opment of theories and methods’. Paragraph
3.3.1 reflects on psychologists’ obligation
under the Responsibility principle not to bring
the profession into disrepute (EFPA, 2005),
which requires them to avoid behaviour that
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might weaken courts’, lawyers’ and the pub-
lic’s perception of the profession as trust-
worthy (see Allan, 2013, 2018). Psychologists
should also promote and maintain high stand-
ards of scientific and professional activity
(EFPA, 2005, para. 3.3.2) while minimising
reasonably foreseeable and preventable harm
(EFPA, 2005, para. 3.3.3).
Possible standards
The four Daubert standards are so well estab-
lished and recognised that it makes sense to
use them as the basis of any proposed
European standards for the use of psycho-
logical tests in psycholegal assessments. They
do, however, need further explanation to make
them useful to lawyers and psychologists –
and they do not cover all the basic require-
ments found in the ethical codes and guide-
lines for psychologists. We believe that the
standards identified can be consolidated under
five headings as follows.
Theoretical basis with peer-
reviewed support
Beecher-Monas (1998) stated that the most
important Daubert standard is that the test
must have a sound and tested theoretical basis,
as well as supporting data accessible in peer-
reviewed journals. The requirement that any
supporting research should have been pub-
lished in reputable peer-reviewed journals
serves to verify that the research has been
scrutinised by objective and competent peers
and that the data has been made available to
those who need it, such as forensic practi-
tioners and lawyers (Allan, 2020).
Psychologists should control for publication
bias when they evaluate the level of support in
the literature for the theoretical basis of
an instrument.
Validity
Psychologists use tests in the psycholegal con-
text to measure constructs that are legally
relevant in order to obtain information that can
be used when preparing a psycholegal report
and testimony (Grisso, 1986). Tests must
therefore be valid in that they measure the con-
struct that the psychologist, and ultimately the
court, wants to know about. Psychologists
should when possible use tests that are standar-
dised for the population that the examinee is
part of (Allan, 2013, 2018, 2020; Allan et al.,
2019). The exact form of validity that is most
important will depend on the legal issue in
question (Heilbrun, 1992).
Construct validity, which subsumes all
other types of validity (see Messick, 1995), is
relevant if psychologists want to measure the
presence of a specific construct, such as a
mental disorder. Criterion (predictive) validity
coefficients of psychological tests typically
vary from .30 to .40, with values above .60
rare (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2017). This is poor
when compared with medicine, where conver-
gent validity values below .70 are generally
considered as indications of validity problems
(see Post, 2016). Given the impact that legal
decisions can have on people’s rights and
interests (see Allan, 2018), psychologists
working in the psycholegal context should
therefore ideally use tests that have validity
coefficients well above .60.
Discriminant and/or predictive validity is
important when psychologists want to identify
people who are likely to reoffend. Predictive
validity is typically determined by calculating
the area under the curve (AUC), which is a
statistical index that represents the average dif-
ference in true positive and false positive rates
across all possible cut-offs (Allan et al., 2006).
The AUC can range from 0 to 1 (suggesting
perfect performance) with an AUC of .50 sug-
gesting a no better than random prediction.
Sj€ostedt and Grann (2002) considered AUC
values of  .60 but < .70 as marginal,  .70
but < .80 as modest,  .80 but < .90 as mod-
erate and  .90 as high. Forensic practitioners
do not stipulate what they consider as an
acceptable AUC but in the scientific literature
.70 is generally considered minimally
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acceptable (Rice & Harris, 2005; Steyerberg,
2009; Szmukler et al., 2012). It is not possible
to recommend a generalised cut-off score for
all kinds of validity measures; yet, psycholo-
gists should thoroughly consider which type of
validity is relevant in each specific case and
choose only tests that have the highest valid-
ity values.
Psychologists should only collect data that
are relevant to the professional tasks that they
are undertaking (EFPA, 2005, para. 3.1.2) and,
therefore, the incremental validity of tests is
important. This form of validity requires that a
test should produce accurate information
beyond what can be obtained more easily and
cheaply with other methods (see Haynes &
Lench, 2003; Hunsley & Meyer, 2003).
Compared to other contexts, incremental valid-
ity is arguably more important in psycholegal
contexts, wherein legal and practical restraints
usually compel psychologists to collect as
little data as possible in the most cost-
efficient manner.
It is inevitable that many people who are
tested in high-stakes situations will try to
manipulate the outcome of an assessment (see
Anglim et al., 2018). Examinees might there-
fore exaggerate or fabricate psychological
symptoms for external gain, such as to evade
criminal responsibility or attain financial com-
pensation. The exact degree of malingering is
unknown, but Mittenberg et al. (2002) have
estimated that 19% of examinees in criminal
cases exaggerate their symptoms. Cartwright
and Roach (2016) furthermore found that
25.4% of their participants admitted having
done so after a road traffic accident. Tests
used in a psycholegal context should therefore
ideally provide a method of checking response
style to detect manipulation (see Paulson
et al., 2019).
Reliability
Reliability in law generally refers to a legal
threshold for the admissibility of evidence (see
Edmond, 2012; Freckelton, 2019), but we fol-
low the Daubert standards by using the word
in the scientific sense (see Popper, 1989). The
indices of reliability that are relevant in a spe-
cific case will depend upon the test and the cir-
cumstances. In the psycholegal context, it will
generally be test-retest reliability for measur-
ing trait variables and interrater reliability for
tests in which professional judgement plays a
significant part in combining and interpreting
data. Historically, psychologists have consid-
ered reliability coefficients above .60 as
acceptable in clinical work (see Fleiss et al.,
2003), but contemporary authors suggest that
reliability should be ‘around .90 for clinical
decision-making and around .70 for research
purposes’ (Groth-Marnat & Wright, 2016, p.
10). Court decisions, however, have major
consequences for litigants and therefore it is
important to minimise the subjective biases of
individual forensic assessors, which suggests a
minimum interrater coefficient above .80 (see
Heilbrun, 1992; Lilienfeld et al., 2000) and
ideally above .90, with Nunnally and
Bernstein (1994) recommending .95.
Availability of test and support
documentation
Heilbrun (1992) requires that tests should be
freely available to other psychologists and
lawyers involved in the case. There are two
reasons for this requirement. First, all expert
witnesses must have access to the relevant test
and supporting material to prepare to testify
(see Pownall v. Conlan Management, 1995; R
v. Turner, 1975). Second, lawyers need access
to these materials in order to prepare to cross-
examine and evaluate the testimony of expert
witnesses. Today this could mean that tests
and their supporting documentation should be
available commercially or online in official
repositories. The supporting information could
be in a manual, book or secure website and
must inform readers about the test’s theoretical
basis and development, references to published
peer-reviewed research supporting it and its
psychometric properties. The manual should
also provide information regarding the standar-
dised administration and scoring of the test,
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and how to use the available information and
population norms to assist with interpretation
(Australian Psychological Society, 2014,
para. 7.1).
Ethical considerations
The ethical issues that might arise will depend
on the test and the circumstances in which it is
used, and we therefore add other relevant eth-
ical concerns to our standards. There are some
requirements that will be relevant in almost all
cases, and the first of these is that there must
be evidence that contemporary psychologists
accept the test as representing best practice
(also see the general acceptance standard in
the Daubert case). This requirement has two
tiers in that the test must be accepted not only
by the general profession for general practice
but also by psychologists who carry out foren-
sic work. It is important to consider the views
of those who undertake psycholegal work
because they have the best understanding of
the demands of courts and the legal rules
that regulate the admission of psycho-
logical evidence.
Psychologists who carry out psycholegal
work should in priority be using tests that pro-
vide relevant and reliable data, and consider
whether or not using the tests poses a risk of
harm to litigants’ rights and interests (see
Allan, 2013, 2018). Psychologists should also
consider the developers’ and users’ govern-
ance of the tests (EFPA, 2005, para. 3.2.2;
Mustac v. Medical Board of Western
Australia, 2007) and important data related to
it – for instance, whether or not potential
examinees can easily access information that
will assist them in manipulating test results.
This is becoming increasingly important as it
becomes possible to place information on
websites (Cartwright et al., 2019). Finally, psy-
chologists should avoid any practice that might
bring the profession into disrepute, a risk that
is much higher when using tests in psycholegal
work as this generally takes place within the
public eye and can attract publicity.
Assessment of the Rorschach
Since Hermann Rorschach published the test
named after him in his book Psychodiagnostik
(Rorschach, 1921/1951), many authors have
written about its strange origins and develop-
ment (e.g. Krishnamurthy et al., 2011; Meyer,
2017; Schott, 2014). Many believe that this
projective personality test is more effective
than its structured self-report counterparts (e.g.
Finn, 1996) because it goes beyond conscious
and behavioural functioning (e.g. Stenius
et al., 2018). Rorschach supporters believe that
it circumvents examinees’ conscious defences
because they respond to ambiguous stimuli
with a minimum of instructions (see Siipola &
Taylor, 1952). They therefore believe that it
provides them information about examinees’
automatic processes and unconscious, struc-
tural and longitudinal functioning (see Weiner
et al., 1996). Furthermore, they claim it can
detect (see Cerney, 1990) and assess the
authenticity of (see Leavitt & Labott, 1996)
recovered repressed traumatic memories about
abuse (however, for a critique see Otgaar
et al., 2019).
If the assumption about the Rorschach’s
ability to circumvent examinees’ conscious
defences is correct then the Court’s comment
in the case of F v. Hungary (2018), as men-
tioned in the introduction, needs to be consid-
ered in every forensic assessment when
projective tests are used. Namely, the Court
stated, ‘it must be considered that consent of
the person concerned [… ] is not freely given’
(F v. Hungary, 2018, para. 53) and that tests
might be used ‘only if they are necessary and
genuinely meet the objectives of [… ] the
European Union or the need to protect the
rights and freedoms of others’ (F v. Hungary,
2018, para. 55). Furthermore, the assumption
also raises the question as to whether or not
the use of the Rorschach leads to violations of
the right to avoid self-incrimination and the
right to remain silent when questioned, either
prior to or during legal proceedings in a court
of law.
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The Rorschach is not a unitary test (Exner,
1969) because there are at least eight well-
known systems that differ notably due to being
developed by people with different theoretical
and professional backgrounds (Groth-Marnat
& Wright, 2016). Examiners can therefore
administer, code and interpret the Rorschach
in different ways (Bornstein & Masling,
2005). Exner (1974, 2000, 2008) tried to over-
come this confusion by developing the
Rorschach Comprehensive System (hereafter
Comprehensive System). This is the most fre-
quently used version of the Rorschach and it
provides normative information for non-
patient adults and children, coupled with statis-
tical tables for some clinical groups (Exner,
2008). Meyer et al. (2007) further published
international norms for the Rorschach known
as the Composite International Reference
Values (CIRV). The Rorschach has always
been problematic (e.g. S. J. Beck, 1937), con-
troversial (Dawes, 1996) and the subject of
many professional debates (e.g. Hibbard,
2003; Mihura et al., 2015; Wood et al., 2015).
The development of the Rorschach continues
(e.g. Gurley, 2017), but despite a century’s
extensive research, development and use, it
remains divisive (Groth-Marnat &
Wright, 2016).
Test must have a theoretical basis and
supporting empirical data that have been
peer reviewed and published in
scientific journals
The projective hypothesis was the original the-
oretical assumption behind the Rorschach
(Rorschach, 1921/1951). At first, it was based
on Freud’s (1911) theory that people uncon-
sciously assign their characteristics and
impulses to others as defence mechanisms.
Nowadays the theoretical underpinning for
projective tests such as the Rorschach is the
assimilative projective assumption (see
Sundberg, 1977). The premise here is that peo-
ple’s understanding, interpretation and explan-
ation of vague and unstructured test stimuli
reflect their internal constructs, such as their
feelings, needs, personal experiences, thought
processes, conflicts and impulses. However,
empirical evidence shows that implicit and
explicit processes might interact to determine
task performance on implicit tasks (Dunn &
Kirsner, 1989). People’s expectations (see
Sherman et al., 2016) and the social context
within which the testing takes place (see Otten
et al., 2017) might therefore influence examin-
ees’ responses.
There is also little theoretical support for
the inferences that examiners draw from vari-
ous aspects of cards, such as colour and per-
sonality. For instance, psychologists associate
attention to red stimuli with anger, impaired
performance on cognitive tasks, sexualised
behaviour, increase aggressiveness, domin-
ance, caution and avoidance behaviour (see
Barchard et al., 2017; Tham et al., 2020). It is,
however, possible that examinees’ responses
might reflect learned associations rather than
their personalities because it is known that
emotion-colour associations vary across cul-
tures (e.g. Hupka et al., 1997).
The Rorschach meets the peer-review
requirement because it has attracted much
scholarly interest since its publication. A
search for the term ‘Rorschach’ on the
PsycINFO© database reveals 6679 peer-
reviewed publications between 1921 and
2019, with about 52% of them published from
1980, and an average of 86.02 peer-reviewed
manuscripts per year from 1980 to 2019. This
amount of research has led to several meta-
analyses, which had mostly confirmed the
effectiveness of the Rorschach (e.g. Parker
et al., 1988). However, more recently the
results of these meta-analyses appear to have
been affected by publication bias and serious
methodological flaws, leading to incorrect and
inflated effect sizes (see Erickson et al., 2007;
Hunsley & Bailey, 1999; Lilienfeld et al.,
2000; Wood et al., 2015). Researchers who
want to examine the published studies com-
plain that they can frequently not obtain the
relevant quantitative material except by pur-
chasing raw data from the original researchers
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(Wood et al., 1996). It is also the case that a
researcher’s request to examine data was
refused even though payment was offered (see
Garb et al., 2020). Other researchers have
criticised the methodology of several key stud-
ies and pointed out that half of the studies with
positive findings were unpublished and, there-
fore, had not been peer reviewed (e.g.
Lilienfeld et al., 2000). Lilienfeld et al. (2000)
have concluded that despite the volume of
research there is a lack of peer-reviewed
research that examines the empirical founda-
tion of the Rorschach in general and the
Comprehensive System in particular.
Validity of test must be appropriate for the
legal question
The organic development of the Rorschach
means that it does not have a specific standard-
isation population, and even supporters of the
Rorschach such as Meyer et al. (2015)
acknowledge that developers of norms have
not given enough attention to the possible
effects of the age, gender, culture, education,
intelligence and linguistic and socioeconomic
background of examinees, and that some of
the findings are in conflict. For example,
Giromini et al., (2017) found that demographic
variables do not influence Rorschach scores,
whereas others found significant effects
(Delavari et al., 2013; Meyer et al., 2007).
Various features of the Rorschach could
influence its validity in cultural and language
groups. Emotion–colour associations, for
instance, vary across cultures, with envy asso-
ciated with black, purple and yellow in Russia
and black, red and green in the United States
(US; see Hupka et al., 1997). French examin-
ees often see a chameleon in card VIII,
Scandinavian examinees often see Christmas
elves in card II and Japanese examinees often
provide a musical instrument-related answer to
card VI. All of these answers are unusual
responses according to the Comprehensive
System (Weiner, 2014). The attempt by
Meyer et al. (2007) to overcome the problems
of using the Rorschach is welcome but the
norms have been criticised on several grounds
(see Gurley, 2017; Meyer et al., 2017).
Several meta-analyses have compared the
Rorschach’s construct validity with that of the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(MMPI; e.g. Garb et al., 1998; Hiller et al.,
1999). These studies have typically shown that
the Rorschach’s variables or indexes have a
low average validity of about .30, and further
that some variables do not correlate with corre-
sponding MMPI variables (see Krishnamurthy
et al., 1996; Lilienfeld et al., 2000). However,
due to the publication bias and methodological
artefacts observed in these meta-analyses,
the .30 value may be overestimated (see
Lilienfeld et al., 2000). Researchers have
failed to find evidence that the Rorschach
can identify a specific psychological problem
(e.g. Bartell & Solanto, 1995; Kaplan &
Saccuzzo, 2017).
When Comprehensive System variables
were correlated with externally (e.g. psychi-
atric diagnosis) and introspectively (e.g. self-
report questionnaires) assessed criteria, the
mean validities were .27 and .08, respectively
(Mihura et al., 2013). Mihura et al. (2013)
found minor support for the validity of
Comprehensive System indices such as Severe
Perceptual-Thinking, Suicide Constellation
and Cognitive Mediation (at least .33), but lit-
tle or no support for indices like Aggressive
Movement, Egocentricity and Coping Style.
Wood et al. (2015) replicated the Mihura et al.
(2013) study but included the data from
unpublished studies to counter the impact of
publication bias. They found that several
Comprehensive System scores based on com-
plexity/synthesis and productivity differentiate
between normal and affected populations.
They, however, found no evidence supporting
a relationship between Comprehensive System
indexes and non-cognitive characteristics such
as negative affect and emotionality. Lilienfeld
et al. (2000) have further reported that the cor-
relations between the Comprehensive System
scores and most psychiatric diagnoses were
not replicated in later studies.
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The validity of the Rorschach overall is
not good (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2017). It
appears to be useful in diagnosing bipolar dis-
order, schizophrenia and schizotypal personal-
ity disorder (Wood et al., 2000). It is,
however, less useful in diagnosing post-trau-
matic stress disorder (PTSD) and other anxiety
disorders, major depressive disorder, suicide
attempts, dissociative identity disorder, psych-
opathy, antisocial personality disorder and
dependent, narcissistic (see Exner, 1995) or
conduct disorders (see Carlson et al., 1997;
Hunsley et al., 2015; Wood et al., 2015). Even
examiners who use the Comprehensive
System’s norms can over-pathologise people
(Cooke & Norris, 2011; Costello, 1998), espe-
cially those from lower socio-economic groups
(Frank, 1994) and children (Hamel et al.,
2000). Research also suggests that the
Rorschach is not a valid instrument for assess-
ing impulsiveness, criminal behaviour or ten-
dency toward violence, or for detecting child
sexual abuse (Lilienfeld et al., 2001).
Suggestions that references by examinees to
buttocks, anuses, feminine clothing and sex
organs in their responses predict homosexual-
ity (e.g. Seitz et al., 1974) have never been
supported by any scientific evidence (see
APA, 2009).
The incremental validity of projective
techniques is generally poor (Garb et al., 2003;
Miller & Nickerson, 2006; Ruscio, 2000).
This is also true for the Rorschach, with little
evidence that most Comprehensive System
scores provide information beyond the data
gathered by other psychological instruments
(Wood et al., 2015).
The Rorschach’s lack of a method for
checking response style is not a concern for
most of its supporters because they believe it
is immune to attempts to fake good or bad
responses (for references, see Acklin, 2007).
For others, the Rorschach is at best relatively
resistant (Grossman et al., 2002) or at worst
vulnerable to faking attempts that might not be
detected through the Rorschach indices (e.g.
Elhai et al., 2004; Hartmann & Hartmann,
2014). The Rorschach performance of malin-
gerers were compared to those of patients with
schizophrenia (see Albert et al., 1980), psych-
osis (Albert et al., 1980), depression (Meisner,
1984) and PTSD (Frueh & Kinder, 1994), for
example. Overall, the results show that only a
few Rorschach variables differ significantly
between the participants who malingered and
those in the control groups (see Frueh &
Kinder, 1994). In addition, the differences
found between role-informed malingerer ver-
sus control and patient groups in some studies
(e.g. Frueh & Kinder, 1994; Overton, 1984)
could be explained by prior training,
knowledge about the pathology and informa-
tion about how to behave during administra-
tion of the test (Albert et al., 1980; Overton,
1984). Albert et al. (1980) furthermore
found that fellows of the Society for
Personality Assessment, who could be
considered Rorschach experts, could only
accurately classify 9% of informed fakers in
the malingerer group (see also Sewell &
Helle, 2018).
A major problem with the Rorschach is
that interpreters put weight on details such as
the area or location of the inkblot that examin-
ees focus on when they respond. There are,
however, many unknown internal and context-
ual factors that could influence examinees’
perceptions and therefore their responses. For
instance, mood (see Matlin, 2012) and affect
(e.g. Anderson et al., 2012; Kleckner et al.,
2017) influence people’s perception of stimuli
and judgements of the actual content of per-
ceptions. This phenomenon of selective and
context-dependent focus is well known
because it is also evident in psychotherapy
(Matt et al., 1992), eyewitness memory recall
(Loftus, 2004) and everyday situations (see
Loeffler et al., 2013). More specifically,
Kingery (2003) found that there is a positive
correlation between dispositional negative
affect and the selection of specific parts of the
inkblots. Any deduction made based on the
locations that examinees focus on therefore
carries little weight without research that
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excludes the possibility that factors such as
situational-induced mood rather than some
underlying personality factor influenced the
relevant response.
Reliability must be appropriate for the
purpose for which test will be used
A problem with the Rorschach as alluded to
earlier is that there are several methods of
administering it and of coding and interpreting
the results (see Bornstein & Masling, 2005).
The administration is in many approaches
deliberately vague (e.g. Siipola & Taylor,
1952) in order to allow examinees to respond
freely to the ambiguous stimuli. This is prob-
lematic because researchers have found that
differences in administration can significantly
influence examinees’ responses (e.g. Lis et al.,
2007) and that it can involve something sim-
ple, such as whether the cards are presented
vertically or horizontally (e.g. D. M. Beck
et al., 2005). The outcomes of the different
scoring systems can also lead to significantly
different interpretations (Kaplan &
Saccuzzo, 2017).
Rorschach supporters have traditionally
relied on experience and/or training, but nei-
ther can substitute for clear, structured and
empirically supported instructions (e.g.
President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology, 2016). The best method for
minimising error is the scientific method and
not clinical experience (Garb et al., 2016), as it
is examiners’ subjectivity that influences the
interpretation of data sets (e.g. Dimsdale,
2015). Harrower (1976) claimed to have
shown this by requesting that 10 examiners
analyse and identify 17 anonymised
Rorschach records of Nazi war criminals that
were mixed up with non-Nazis ones. The out-
come was that the examiners performed no
better than chance and were thus not able to
discriminate Nazi war criminals’ Rorschach
protocols from non-Nazi ones. A limitation of
this study is that the examiners did not have
the background information that they would
generally have in a clinical or psycholegal
context (Groth-Marnat & Wright, 2016).
While trying to reduce the impact of exam-
iners’ subjectivity in the coding process by
providing working tables, Exner (2008) con-
ceded that it would be naïve to expect object-
ive coding (see also Acklin et al., 2000).
Research conducted in the 1980s and
1990s therefore predictably yielded contradict-
ing and confusing results, but Parker’s (1983)
meta-analysis of 39 research papers neverthe-
less found an overall internal reliability coeffi-
cient of .83. Garb et al. (1998) criticised
Parker’s method, but methodologically sound
research has made compatible findings with
median test-retest coefficients of .80 reported
(e.g. Acklin et al., 2000). The interrater reli-
ability of the various Comprehensive System
variables is even slightly better, with Exner
(2003) reporting that the interrater scoring reli-
ability of all variables was above .85 and
Meyer’s (1997) meta-analysis of 16 studies
finding interrater reliability coefficients rang-
ing from .72 to .96. Other researchers, how-
ever, have found lower coefficients (e.g. W.
Perry et al., 1995; Wood et al., 1996) and
criticised Meyer’s study as flawed. Acklin
et al. (2000) found that half of the
Comprehensive System variables attained reli-
ability coefficients of .85 or above whilst some
of the others, such as the Schizophrenia Index
(SCZI), are as low as .45 with a median retest
coefficient of .80. A later study by Sultan et al.
(2006), who retested 75 French non-patient
adults after 3 months using the 47
Comprehensive System variables, found that 9
coefficients were above .70 and 21 yielded
moderate reliability of above .50, while the
median correlation coefficient was .53.
Availability of test and supporting
documentation
The Rorschach is commercially available to
examiners, and each of the systems give
administering, scoring and coding instructions
(see Bornstein & Masling, 2005). It serves lit-
tle purpose to examine the supporting docu-
mentation of each system, but Exner’s (2008)
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workbook for the extensively used
Comprehensive System is arguably the most
informative. It provides a standardised method
of administration, scoring and interpretation,
as well as information about the test’s psycho-
metric properties and population norms.
Several researchers have nevertheless
criticised the composition of the normative
sample (Hibbard, 2003; Viglione &
Giromini, 2016).
Ethical requirements
The first ethical question regarding the
Rorschach is whether or not it is generally
accepted by psychologists as representing best
practice and as being appropriate for psychole-
gal practice. It is difficult to give a definite
answer because it is one of the most divisive
tests used in psychology, with many support-
ers and detractors (Groth-Marnat & Wright,
2016). In making an award for distinguished
professional contributions to John E. Exner,
the APA (1998) described the Rorschach as
probably the most powerful psychometric tool
ever invented, and many others share the belief
that it is the equivalent of a psychological X-
ray test (e.g. Brown, 1992; Piotrowski, 1980).
Others criticise it as a pseudoscience (e.g.
Fontan & Andronikof, 2017; Wood et al.,
2008) and criticise its use in clinical (e.g.
Huberty, 2019; Hunsley & Bailey, 2001;
Lilienfeld, 2015) and forensic (e.g. Garb,
1999; Wood et al., 2001) settings due to its
poor psychometric characteristics. Surveys of
forensic practitioners in North America have
nevertheless revealed that the Rorschach was
the most frequently used unstructured project-
ive test, with up to 36% of research partici-
pants reporting that they had used it (see
Archer et al., 2006). More recent North
American research, however, shows that the
frequency of Rorschach use has dropped down
to 20% (Viljoen et al., 2010) or even to 3%
(Neal & Grisso, 2014). The acceptance of the
Rorschach amongst forensic psychologists in
other countries might never have been good.
Martin et al. (2001), for instance, found in
their survey that Australian psychologists
doing court work used the Rorschach less fre-
quently than other tests; it had a weighted use
score of only 23 compared to the 141 score of
the Wechsler Intelligence Scale and the 98 of
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory-2 (MMPI-2).
The limitations of the Rorschach discussed
above further raise questions about how confi-
dent psychologists who use it can be that the
data they provide to courts are objective, rele-
vant and reliable (see Erickson et al., 2007;
Iudici et al., 2015; Neal et al., 2019). They
might therefore find it difficult to demonstrate
that they were taking reasonable steps to pre-
vent reasonably foreseeable and preventable
harm such as was present in F v. Hungary
(2018), where the applicant ran the risk of
being returned to a country where he could
have been persecuted.
The governance of the Rorschach is also in
question because there is so much information
available about it in publications and the
media. There are over 20 million references
associated with the term ‘Rorschach’ on the
Internet and it has its own English Wikipedia
page (Wikipedia, 2021), with descriptions of
the most common responses extracted from
Weiner (2003) and Weiner and Greene (2007).
Schultz and Loving (2012) concluded that
19% of the Rorschach-related information
they found on the Internet posed a direct threat
to the security of the test. Schultz and
Brabender (2013) assessed the influence of the
Rorschach Wikipedia page’s content on the
protocols of non-patients who were instructed
to act as parents who want to keep their chil-
dren, and thus, fake-good. They showed that,
relative to an uninformed (control) group,
well-educated non-patients benefited from
exposure to Wikipedia content. Researchers
were, however, not able to replicate these find-
ing with psychiatric outpatients (Hartmann &
Hartmann, 2014) or incarcerated violent
offenders (Nørbech et al., 2016). Patients in
the informed group failed to present as men-
tally well adjusted on the Rorschach but
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they were able to inhibit provocative, aggres-
sive and dramatic responses relative to other
patient groups (Hartmann & Hartmann, 2014).
The use of the Rorschach in court further
weakens the credibility of the profession and
undermines courts’, lawyers’ and the public’s
perception of the profession as being trust-
worthy. This is demonstrated by remarks
made by the judges in F v. Hungary (2018),
lawyers who commented on the case (e.g.
Ferreira & Venturi, 2018) and journalists from
reputable outlets such as the New York Times
(Goode, 2001), New Scientist (Wilson, 2020)
and BBC News (‘What’s behind the
Rorschach inkblot test?’, 2012).
A feature of the administration of the
Rorschach which requires consideration is that
examiners often repeat requests for extensive
answers, and may make negative inferences if
examinees fail to provide enough information
(Exner, 2008). There is a risk that examinees
in forensic contexts will therefore feel coerced
by examiners, whom they perceive as author-
ity figures. It is notable that the judges in F v.
Hungary (2018) found that consent for psy-
cholegal assessment in that specific type of
case can never be voluntary.
Discussion
F v. Hungary (2018) is a reminder to psychol-
ogists who do psycholegal work of the impact
their reports can have on the rights and inter-
ests of people and that lawyers and courts will
therefore approach their reports and testimony
critically. Psychologists should consequently
ensure that they use tests which can withstand
the scrutiny of both their peers and lawyers.
Some might therefore regret that the judges in
F v. Hungary (2018) did not set out clear
standards that can be used to consider the cred-
ibility of a test – but it does nevertheless pro-
vide the profession with an opportunity to
formulate and publish a set of generally
accepted standards that they and lawyers can
refer to when assessing the acceptability of a
test. We believe that most psychologists who
undertake forensic work might consciously or
non-consciously apply the standards that we
have identified when deciding whether or not
to use a specific test to collect data. We delib-
erately did not add details such as what would
be an acceptable test-retest correlation coeffi-
cient for two reasons. First, it would be more
appropriate to do so after a debate by psycho-
legal professionals. Second, it is always at a
court’s discretion whether or not it allows tes-
timony, and courts will therefore not be bound
by our standards or by any details that the pro-
fession adds. Courts and lawyers will never-
theless most likely consider standards and
guidelines that represent psychologists’ gen-
eral views.
The proposed standards are primarily
aimed at assessing the appropriateness of
emerging theories, techniques and tests in
court, which makes their application to a
well-established and well-researched test
such as the Rorschach more difficult but
nevertheless not impossible. A major con-
cern regarding the Rorschach is that it lacks
a theoretical basis supported by empirical
data (e.g. Krishnamurthy et al., 2011) and
that it is rather based on subjective common-
sense thinking than on scientific research.
The strategies of Exner (2008) and others to
develop norms and train examiners is no sub-
stitute for an empirically tested theory
(President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology, 2016) and is contrary to the
contemporary emphasis on evidence-based
methods in assessments (see Stewart &
Chambless, 2007).
The Comprehensive System’s construct
validity is another major problem because a
test does not have a place in psycholegal work
if it does not measure what it is supposed to
measure. Groth-Marnat and Wright (2016)
concluded that the overall validity of the
Rorschach is moderate (between .30 and .50).
It is difficult to draw a conclusive finding
about the validity of many Comprehensive
System indices because some have not yet
been studied well, and the accuracy of the
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studies that have examined the validity of
other indices is contested (Garb et al., 2005).
An expert witness will therefore find it diffi-
cult to justify using even the Comprehensive
System, especially given that it lacks an
acceptable method of measuring response style
and that research data show that the Rorschach
is susceptible to faking (e.g. Perry &
Kinder, 1990).
The test-retest reliability coefficients of the
Rorschach indices that range from .27 to .94
(see Meyer, 1997) limit its application in foren-
sic work where the stakes for people are high,
and this could explain why Rorschach experts
disagree when they give forensic opinions (see
Guarnera et al., 2017). The Rorschach meets
the availability standard and Exner’s (2008)
book provides most of the information required
regarding the Comprehensive Systems.
A major hurdle for anybody who plans to
use the Rorschach in court is, however,
whether or not it would be ethical to do so.
Our assessment is that there is no general
acceptance amongst forensic psychologists
internationally that it is a test that should be
used in court (e.g. Archer et al., 2016).
Psychologists who want to use the Rorschach
test should tell courts that it is highly contro-
versial and not widely accepted (Lilienfeld
et al., 2000), but this is unlikely to happen.
The evidence we have reviewed further
suggests that the Rorschach does not provide
objective, relevant and reliable data and there-
fore that psychologists who use it cannot
exclude the possibility that their reports and
testimony will cause reasonably foreseeable
and avoidable harm. The governance of the
test is also poor, and this is particularly con-
cerning given that it lacks a method of measur-
ing response style. Psychologists’ use of the
Rorschach in court further appears to impact
on the credibility of the whole profession and
might constitute non-proportional violation of
examinees’ autonomy. Our overall conclusion
is therefore that – despite its popularity in
some European countries (see Areh, 2020) –
the Rorschach does not meet the standards
which we believe the international scientific
community requires of tests used in psychole-
gal work, and consequently that psychologists
should not use it in court (but for a contrary
view, see Weiner et al., 1996).
In conclusion, psychologists should only
use tests whose reliability and validity have
been demonstrated rigorously. We expect that
some other commonly used techniques and
tests might also be found wanting if the stand-
ards set out above are applied to them. We do
not think that these standards are unnecessarily
arduous because if psychologists expect the
public and more specifically legal professio-
nals to trust them and their testimony, they
must ensure that they use tests and techniques
that are trustworthy and that do not violate the
human rights of the persons assessed. In the
case of F v. Hungary (2018), the Court of
Justice of the European Union ruled that an
expert’s report is only acceptable if it is based
on sufficiently reliable methods which meet
standards recognised by the international sci-
entific community. The Court did not convey
what these standards are or decide whether or
not projective tests are acceptable. This might
be due to the Court’s trust in psychology as a
profession, and other sciences, to fulfil its
expectations. Should the profession fail to do
so, a court could set standards for psycholo-
gists or it might decide that psychological
expert opinions are not reliable enough to be
received as scientific evidence.
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